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Abstract
In a basic related-key attack against a block cipher, the adversary has access to encryptions under keys
that differ from the target key by bit-flips. In this short note we show that for a quantum adversary such
attacks are quite powerful: if the secret key is (i) uniquely determined by a small number of plaintext-
ciphertext pairs, (ii) the block cipher can be evaluated efficiently, and (iii) a superposition of related keys
can be queried, then the key can be extracted efficiently.
1 INTRODUCTION
The availability of scalable quantum computers would jeopardize the security of many currently deployed
asymmetric cryptographic schemes [1]. For symmetric cryptography the expectations for a post-quantum
setting tend to be more optimistic, see e.g. [2], from which we quote “quantum computers seem to have very
little effect on secret-key cryptography, hash functions, etc. Grover’s algorithm forces somewhat larger key
sizes for secret-key ciphers, but this effect is essentially uniform across ciphers; today’s fastest pre-quantum
256-bit ciphers are also the fastest candidates for post-quantum ciphers at a reasonable security level.”
Related-key attacks are a powerful cryptanalytic tool when exploring block ciphers. In such attacks,
the adversary is granted access to encryptions and/or decryptions of messages under secret keys which are
related to the target key in a known or chosen way. As argued in [3], this type of attack is of practical
interest, despite the assumptions made. When Winternitz and Hellman described this attack model more
than 25 years ago, they focused on key relations given by bit-flips [4]. An illustrative example for an
application of this attack model is an attack against 9 rounds of Rijndael with a 256-bit key, invoking 256
related keys with a particular choice of the bit-flips [5].
Current approaches to formalize related-key attacks allow more general key relations [6, 7], and restrict-
ing to bit-flips can be considered to be a rather conservative choice. Below we show that for a quantum
adversary such a basic form of related-key attack is quite powerful. We show that the possibility to query
a superposition of related keys to a block cipher enables the efficient extraction of the secret key, if some
rather mild conditions are met:
1. the block cipher can be implemented efficiently as a quantum circuit, and
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2. the secret key is uniquely determined by a small number of available plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
The attack we describe is unlikely to pose a practical threat as querying a superposition of secret keys may
not be feasible for a typical implementation. Notwithstanding this, from the structural point of view our
observation indicates an interesting limitation for the security guarantees of a block cipher that one can hope
to prove in a post-quantum scenario.
2 PRELIMINARIES
A block cipher with key length k and block length n is a family of 2k permutations {EK : {0,1}n −→
{0,1}n}K∈{0,1}k on bitstrings of length n. Popular block ciphers limit the possible choices of the key length
k—e. g., for the Advanced Encryption Standard [8] we have n = 128 and k ∈ {128,192,256}. To character-
ize the efficiency of certain types of attacks, it can nonetheless be convenient to consider families of block
ciphers, interpreting the key length k as a scalable security parameter. Measuring the running time of an
adversary as a function of k, it is meaningful to speak of an expected polynomial time attack.
2.1 Related-key attacks
The attack model we consider goes back to [4]. After a key K ∈ {0,1}k has been chosen uniformly at
random, the adversary has access to two oracles:
E: On input a bitmask L ∈ {0,1}k and a bitstring m ∈ {0,1}n, this oracle returns the encryption EK⊕L(m)
of m under the key K⊕L.
E−1: On input a bitmask L ∈ {0,1}k and a bitstring c ∈ {0,1}n, this oracle returns the decryption E−1K⊕L(c)
of c under the key K⊕L.
After interacting with these oracles, the adversary has to output a guess K′ for K, and it is considered
successful if and only if K = K′. For our attack we will also assume that the block cipher at hand can be
evaluated efficiently, i. e., with a polynomial-size quantum circuit that has the secret key and a plaintext as
input. For block ciphers that are actually used this condition is of no concern.
The quantum attack below will not involve E−1, but we will allow the adversary to query the block
cipher and also the oracle E with a superposition of keys. Finally, we require that the adversary has access
to a polynomial number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs (m1,c1), . . . ,(mr,cr) such that there exists exactly one
secret key K ∈ {0,1}k satisfying
(c1, . . . ,cr) = (EK(m1), . . . ,EK(mr)).
It is easy to come up with a pathological block cipher where the secret key cannot be uniquely determined
by any number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs1, but for typical block ciphers we do not think this to be a
concern. In [9, Definition 7.34] the known plaintext unicity distance is defined as a measure for the number
of (known) plaintext-ciphertext pairs that are needed to determine the secret key of a block cipher uniquely,
and with [9, Fact 7.35] it seems plausible to estimate that for an n-bit block cipher with key length k having
r > dk/ne (1)
1Encryption and decryption can simply ignore parts of the secret key.
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plaintext-ciphertext pairs suffices. So for the 128-bit version of AES, where n = k = 128, one can think
of an r-value as small as 2. Throughout we will assume that r satisfies Inequality (1). Then the main idea
to mount a quantum related-key attack is a reduction to a quantum algorithm described in [10] which we
describe next.
2.2 Simon’s problem
Let f : {0,1}k −→ {0,1}k′ with k ≤ k′ be a function such that one of the following two conditions holds:
(a) f is injective;
(b) there exists a bitstring s ∈ {0,1}k \{0k} such that for every two distinct x,x′ ∈ {0,1}k we have
f (x) = f (x′) ⇐⇒ x = x′⊕ s.
Simon’s problem asks to decide for such a function f which of the two conditions holds, and in the case (b)
to find s. Allowing the function f to be evaluated at a superposition of inputs, [10] establishes the following
result:
Theorem 1 Let g(k) be an upper bound for the time needed to solve a k× k linear system of equations
over the binary field F2, and let t f (k) be an upper bound for the time needed to evaluate the function
f on (a superposition of) inputs from {0,1}k. Then the above problem can be solved in expected time
O(k · t f (k) + g(k)). In particular, for t f = t f (k) being polynomial, the above problem can be solved in
expected polynomial time.
3 Description of the attack
Alluding to the Electronic Code Book mode of operation [9, Section 7.2.2], subsequently we will simply
write EK(~m) for the tuple of ciphertext blocks (EK(m1), . . . ,EK(mr))∈ {0,1}rn. For a fixed, unknown secret
key s ∈ {0,1}k \{0k} and messages ~m ∈ {0,1}rn that characterize the s uniquely as described in Section 2,
we define the function
fs : {0,1}k −→ 2{0,1}rn
x 7−→ {Ex(~m),Es⊕x(~m)} .
We remark that for each x in the domain of fs, the image is comprised of two different ciphertexts, i. e.,
it does not collapse to a singleton set. Indeed, this is the case due to the choice of the plaintexts m1, . . . ,mr
as the condition s 6= 0k implies that Ex(~m) 6= Es⊕x(~m). We next describe our core result, namely a reduction
from the problem of finding the secret key s to an instance of Simon’s problem which can then be solved
efficiently on a quantum computer.
Meeting the conditions of Simon’s problem To argue that fs meets the conditions of Theorem 1, let us
first clarify how to encode the images as elements of {0,1}k′ for some k′ ≥ k. As we impose condition (1),
with k′=(rn+ rn)=2rn we clearly have k′ ≥ k as desired. By interpreting elements in {0,1}rn as (unsigned)
integers, we can impose a linear order on {0,1}rn. Then, to store an element {c,c′} in the image of fs, we
simply store the ordered pair (min(c,c′),max(c,c′)) as its unique k′-bit representation.
Next, consider two different k-bit strings x 6= x′ that satisfy fs(x) = fs(x′):
3
Figure 1: Quantum circuit to implement a quantum related-key attack on a block cipher via a reduction to an
instance of Simon’s problem. The basic building blocks of this circuit are described in more detail in the text.
The circuit makes use of calls to the block cipher for keys x to obtain encryptions Ex(~m) and of calls to the
related-key oracle to obtain the corresponding encryptions Ex⊕s(~m) with respect to the related keys x⊕s that
are obtained from the secret key s via exclusive-OR (XOR) masks. Further detail on the comparison circuits
is given in Figure 3. In the center of the circuit is a sequence of four copy operations via CNOTs to pick
out the desired register and copy it into the target registers holding min(c,c′) and max(c,c′), respectively.
We make use of a graphical notation that employs control knobs of different sizes which is described further
in Figure 4. Together, the comparison and copy operations realize the data structure of an unordered set
which we use in our reduction to Simon’s problem. Upon measurement of the first register, a k-bit vector
y ∈ {0,1}k is obtained which due to our construction is perpendicular to the secret key s ∈ {0,1}k. After
O(k) iterations, with constant probability the secret key can be reconstructed from the measurement data.
• If Ex(~m) = Ex′(~m) then the choice of the plaintexts m1, . . . ,mr implies x = x′, so this cannot happen.
• If Ex(~m) 6= Ex′(~m), then Ex(~m) = Es⊕x′(~m), which by the choice of the plaintexts m1, . . . ,mr means
that x = s⊕ x′.
So we have the implication fs(x) = fs(x′) =⇒ x = x′⊕s. The converse follows trivially from s⊕(x′⊕s) = x′.
Next, let us check that the function fs(·) can be evaluated efficiently.
Evaluating fs(·) in polynomial time By assumption the underlying block cipher can be evaluated with a
polynomial-size quantum circuit, so computing the two values Ex(~m) and Es⊕x(~m) for a given x can certainly
be done in polynomial time. In the actual attack, the value Es⊕x(~m) is obtained by invoking the encryption
oracle E for each of the plaintexts m1, . . . ,mr, i. e., with a polynomial number of queries to E . This means
we can obtain the pair (Ex(~m),Es⊕x(~m)) in polynomial time, and we are left to distill our unique k′-bit
representation of the set comprised by these two elements.
As indicated in the previous paragraph, such a representation can be implemented by interpreting the two
ciphertexts as integers and by then sorting them. A quantum circuit to determine this unique representation
of a pair of bitvectors consists of swapping Ex(~m) and Es⊕x(~m) conditioned on the the latter value being
smaller than the former. For instance with a reversible circuit to perform addition [13, 14, 15] one can
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compute the difference of the binary numbers represented by Ex(~m) and Es⊕x(~m) in polynomial time. The
most significant bit of the result then reveals the result of the comparison. The swap operation can be
conditioned on this bit, followed by an uncomputation of the garbage introduced by the adder [16].
Figure 2: Quantum oracle to implement the encryption of a tuple ~m of messages under an encryption key
x⊕ s that is related to the secret key s via addition of an XOR mask x. Note that the circuit for s = 0 is
needed in Figure 1 also and this circuit can—by assumption on the cipher—be efficiently implemented. The
shifted version of the cipher has to be given as a block-box circuit which we can evaluate in superposition.
Figure 3: Quantum circuit for the comparison of two n bit integers. An efficient implementation can, e. g.,
be obtained by computing the difference i− j in one’s complement form and then keeping only the highest
order bit (see [13, 14]).
In Figure 1 we display the resulting quantum circuit. Note that each computation of an intermediate
result has to be uncomputed or else interference between the various computational paths could not take
place. The overall structure of the circuit is that of a Fourier sampling circuit, i.e., a circuit type that arises
in the solution of abelian hidden subgroup problems [11, 12].
The implementation of the hiding function fs is decomposed into several subroutines to make the circuit
more readable: in a first stage, the classical k-bit vector x is fanned out into two copies using a CNOT
gate (note that a line with a tick denotes a quantum register holding two or more qubits). The value x is
then passed to a subroutine computing Ex(~m), respectively Ex⊕s(~m) in superposition. These subroutines
are carried out by circuits as in Figure 2. An efficient cirucit for Ex(~m) can be synthesized by making the
efficient circuit (which by assumption exists) reversible. For the implementation of Ex⊕s(~m) we make use
of the related-key oracle E . Throughout, it should be noted that ~m is a vector that uniquely characterizes s
as in Section 2.1.
The “COMP” operation is shown in Figure 3 and can be realized similarly to addition of integers. See
also [13, 14] for implementations of comparison circuits that optimize circuit width, respectively circuit
depth. The result of the comparison is then used to copy the smaller of the two registers (when interpreted
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Figure 4: Quantum circuit to implement a controlled copy operation from one quantum register to another
quantum register. In the figure, the source register consists of the upper n qubits, the target register of the
lower n qubits, and the control qubit sits in the middle.
as integers) into the uppermost of the last two registers and the larger one into the lower one. Finally, in
Figure 4 one of the operations is shown that allow to select one of the two registers holding an rn-bit integer,
depending on the value of the comparison operation. The other type which picks a register controlled by the
negated value of the comparison bit is implemented analogously. Overall we have established the following
result.
Theorem 2 For every s ∈ {0,1}k \ {0k} the function fs defined above satisfies the conditions needed to
apply Theorem 1, and the bound t fs can be chosen to be polynomial.
By combining Theorems 1 and 2 we now obtain the following quantum related-key attack which runs in
expected polynomial time:
1. Check if the secret target key s is the all-zero key s = 0k by computing E0k(~m) and comparing these
ciphertexts with the given ciphertexts Es(~m).
2. If s 6= 0k then apply Simon’s algorithm—which constitutes the proof of Theorem 1—to recover s.
4 Conclusion
This note shows that in a quantum setting even a basic related-key attack is very powerful: under rather mild
assumptions on the attacked block cipher the secret key can be extracted efficiently.
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